On August 5, 1949. a group of smokejumpers, specially trained fire crews had parachuted into Munn Gulch in the Helena National Forest in Montana. They were fighting a routine fire that suddenly that exploded into an inferno in a phenomenon known as a blowup. With disaster looming, the crew began running from a rapidly advancing wall of flame. It was a race they could not win.
The men were running for their lives. Suddenly, in a move that is controversial to this day, Foreman Wagner Dodge suddenly stopped and lit a fire in the dry grass around him. He was lighting an escape fire. It was a technique that was unknown in those days, but is commonplace today. Today, firefighters know all about “keeping one foot in the black,” meaning that the advancing fire would not be able to jump across an area which had been starved of fuel.
Dodge ordered his men to join them, but by that time, the men were fleeing in all directions They may have thought he was crazy. They may have not been able to hear him over the roar of the approaching flames.
Dodge threw himself down into the ashes of his escape fire. Two rookie firefighters ran alongside Dodge’s escape fire as it ran up the hill toward a ridge of rim rock. It saved their lives. They made their way through a cleft in rim rock and made it safely to the other side when they got into a rock slide.
The fire passed them by. Dodge survived as the fire jumped over him. The other thirteen fire jumpers were killed.
T
he tragedy did have a positive impact on forest firefighting. The incident has been taught to thousands of firefighters as a training course over the years since 1949. Procedures were re-written and safety rules created. Before fighting fires, safety zones must be designated and escape routes chosen in advance. A clear chain of command is required. Actions must be based on predicted fire behavior. Crew safety is the number one consideration in the decision making process.
There were no other fatalities among smokejumpers in the U.S. until 1994’s South Canyon Fire on Storm King Mountain in Colorado. The South Canyon Fire was replay of Mann Gulch. The fire’s behavior was not monitored and forecasts of increasing winds did not reach firefighters. 14 firefighters were killed when the lessons learned 45 years earlier were not heeded.
The men were running for their lives. Suddenly, in a move that is controversial to this day, Foreman Wagner Dodge suddenly stopped and lit a fire in the dry grass around him. He was lighting an escape fire. It was a technique that was unknown in those days, but is commonplace today. Today, firefighters know all about “keeping one foot in the black,” meaning that the advancing fire would not be able to jump across an area which had been starved of fuel.
Dodge ordered his men to join them, but by that time, the men were fleeing in all directions They may have thought he was crazy. They may have not been able to hear him over the roar of the approaching flames.
Dodge threw himself down into the ashes of his escape fire. Two rookie firefighters ran alongside Dodge’s escape fire as it ran up the hill toward a ridge of rim rock. It saved their lives. They made their way through a cleft in rim rock and made it safely to the other side when they got into a rock slide.
The fire passed them by. Dodge survived as the fire jumped over him. The other thirteen fire jumpers were killed.
T
he tragedy did have a positive impact on forest firefighting. The incident has been taught to thousands of firefighters as a training course over the years since 1949. Procedures were re-written and safety rules created. Before fighting fires, safety zones must be designated and escape routes chosen in advance. A clear chain of command is required. Actions must be based on predicted fire behavior. Crew safety is the number one consideration in the decision making process.
There were no other fatalities among smokejumpers in the U.S. until 1994’s South Canyon Fire on Storm King Mountain in Colorado. The South Canyon Fire was replay of Mann Gulch. The fire’s behavior was not monitored and forecasts of increasing winds did not reach firefighters. 14 firefighters were killed when the lessons learned 45 years earlier were not heeded.